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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
c;. Jl. BENN ION, 
v. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
CULF 01 L CORPORATION, a 
Pennsylvania corporation and 
the UTAH BOARD OF OIL, 
GAS AND an Agency of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Case No, 19144 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an action brought by Bennion in the 
lower court wherein Bennion contested the validity of an 
administrative order entered by the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining in Cause No. 139-20, October 3, 1980 as amended in Cause No. 
IJ9-20[B], October 22, 1981. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied Bennion's motion for summary 
J 1Jdgment and granted Gulf's cross motion for Summary judgment on the 
•rounds that the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining acted 
properly and within its authority as to matlers complained <)f by 
flennion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Gulf 011 Corporation, seeks affirmation of the 
lower court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Gulf. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With the exception of those matters hereinbelow specified, 
Respondent agrees with and accepts Appellant's statement and 
characterization of the facts. 
On or about August 25, 1980, the Utah State Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining (hereinafter referred to as the "Division") gave 
approval for: 
Gulf to drill the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well, as 
an infill test well •.• within the area 
spaced under the order issued in Cause No. 
139-8. The above well was approved as a 
60-day test drilling well and the Division's 
letter disallowed simultaneous production of 
the test well and the Albert Smith #l-8C5 
well which is presently under production, 
beyond the period of testing allowed by the 
Division. (R. at p.155) 
Thereafter, Bennion petitioned the Division to enjoin the 
drilling of the Albert Smith 2-i:lC5 as being violative of the 
Board's spacing order in Cause No. 139-8. (R. at p. 155). The issue 
was ultimately resolved before the Board in Cause No. 139-20 (dated 
October 3, 1980), wherein the i:loard concluded, inter alia, that the 
·Jntinued operation of the Albert Smith #2-8C5 test well during the 
"l'l1rovecl bO-day test period did not violate the Oil and Gas 
ion Act nor the board's order in Cause No. 139-8. (R. at 
1)9 and 181). 
On page 4 of its brief, Appellant characterizes the Albert 
Srn1 th 2-8C5 Well as a "test" well. The record clearly establishes 
that this well was in fact an infill test well. (R. at pp. 15 and 
I SS). 
After expiration of the 60-day test period, simultaneous 
production from the Albert Smith 1-8C5 Well and the Albert Smith 
2-8C5 Well was expressly disallowed. (R. at pp. 15, 155 and 159). 
lt was equally clear that upon notice and hearing, the Albert Smith 
2-8C5 Well could be and was so designated as the production well for 
rhe subject drilling/spacing unit. (R. at pp. 160-161 ). To ensure 
that both wells would not simultaneously be producing after the 
bu-day test period, Gulf shut-in the Albert Smith 1-8C5 Well on or 
aoout March 1 0, 1981, (R. at pp. 200-202 and p. 211) and thereafter 
petitioned the Board to designate the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well as the 
producing unit well for the subject drilling unit. 
Respondent objects to Appellant's statement on pp. 4 and 5 
of its brief that at the April 30, 1981 hearing before the Board 
[Cause No. 1J9-20(B)], only certain selective evidence was introduced 
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pertaining to the Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 and No. 2-8C5 Wells. 
Actually, the state production reports pertaining to both wells were 
also introduced into the record for the period of January - March, 
1981. (R. at p. 236). Further, it was the testimony of an expert 
witness, relating to the size of the reservoir, etc., that: 
We have no idea of what the extent of the 
reservoir is. We can't know that at this 
time.*** It's almost impossible to 
determine what's going to happen from one well 
to the next as far as correlating sands and 
production. 
[R. at 203, 204 - Transcript of Hearing for Cause No. 139-20(B) -
testimony of Mark Anthony]. 
Respondent strenuously objects to appellant's use and 
interpretation of production data relating to the two wells as 
contained on pages 5 and 6 of its brief. We ask this Honorable Court 
to consider the following chronology: 
April 30, 1981: 
October 22, 1981: 
January 10, 1982: 
December 31 , 1 982: 
January 4, 1983: 
Hearing before the Board of Oil, Gas 
and Mining, Order in Cause No. 139-20. 
Date of Order in Cause No. 139-20(B) 
which reaffirms the Order in Cause No. 
139-20 retroactive to April 30, 1981, 
but for purposes of appeal not entered 
until October 22, 1981. 
Complaint filed in Cause No. C-82-458 
appealing the Board's Order in Cause 
No. 139-20 (B). 
Date of Affidavit of Stephen W. Rupp 
which contained as attachments thereto 
annual monthly production reports of 
the Albert Smith No. 2-8C5 Well for the 
years 1981 through September, 1982. 
Argument held by the lower court on 
parties' cross motions for summary 
j udgrnent. 
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March 3 1 983: 
March 3 1 983: 
March 1 7 1 983: 
Mr. Rupp' s Affidavit of December 31, 
1982 filed in the Clerk's Office in 
Civil No. C-82-458. 
Lower court's Memorandum Decision 
granting Gulf's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Judgment of the lower court granting 
Gulf's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denying Bennion's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
We ask this Court to note that the only evidentiary hearing 
in this matter was conducted by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on 
April 30, 1981. At that hearing, the only evidence introduced as to 
production records was that relating to the months of January to 
March, 1981, as to the two wells (Tr., Cause No. 139-20(B), R. at 
236). The lower court in Civil C-82-458 did not conduct a trial de 
novo; it heard counsel argue the merits of their respective motions 
for summary judgment. We submit that the filing of Mr. Rupp's 
December 31 ,-1982 Affidavit on March 3, 1983 - the day of the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision - is a novel approach to the introduction 
of evidence. In presenting this factual data for the first time on 
appeal, Appellant violates the well known rule that matters neither 
raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial court level (in 
this case, the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining) cannot be considered for 
the first time on appeal. Walton v Walton, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 
1978); Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702, 705 (1971); 
IJgesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456, 457 
(1%2). 
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The chronology outlined above demonstrates: (a) the 
impropriety of Appellant's statement: "After the April 30 hearing 
the production of the second well steadily decreased until the well 
was no more and usually considerably less than production from the 
first well when shut in (App. Brief, page 4); and (b) the fallacy of 
Appellant's concluding sentence: "This fact [the knowledge of 
declining production after the April 30 hearing] was evident before 
the Board ruled" (App. Brief, page 4). 
Unless the Board was blessed with an extra sensory 
perception, it seems unreasonable to ask it to consider on April 30, 
1981, matters which were yet to transpire. 
We reject out of hand Appellant's statements of these 
"facts" and ask this Court to consider the salient issues presented 
by this appeal and to disregard the irrelevencies appellant would use 
to cloud the real matters at hand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CIVIL NO. C-80-7024 - RES JUDICATA 
By Complaint dated September 9, 1980 Bennion (Appellant 
herein) initiated a civil action before the Third Judicial District 
Court (S.H. Bennion v. Gulf Oil Corp., Civil No. C-80-7024) praying 
for a temporary order restraining Gulf Oil Corporation from the 
continued drilling of the Albert Smith No. 2-8C5 Well; Bennion also 
prayed that the Court, upon final hearing, permanently enjoin Gulf 
b 
u1l Corporation, its agents, etc., from the continued drilling of 
said well under the present spacing scheme authorized under the Order 
in Cause No. 139-8. 
On September 24, 1980, the Court continued the matter in 
Civil No. 80-7024 and remanded it for hearing by the Board of Oil, 
Gas & Mining for a ruling on the following issues: 
(a) Did the Division have authority to grant the exception 
location to allow the drilling of a test well in this matter?; 
(b) Should the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well be enjoined from 
operation as being in violation of the Board's Order in Cause No. 
139-8 or section 40-6-6(c), U.C.A. 1953?; and 
(c) If, in the alternative, approval to drill the infill 
test well was properly granted, what allocation of cost should be 
made with respect to the production of said well? (R. at 93). 
In response to the Court's direction, the Board, on 
September 25, 1980, convened an emergency hearing which resulted in 
the issuance of its Order in Cause No. 139-20 holding that: (1) the 
Board and Division had a mandate under Section 40-6-1 of the Oil & 
Gas Conservation Act to maximize recovery of oil and gas from the 
Bluebell-Altamont Field and that the Division was acting within the 
scope of its delegated authority to approve the Albert Smith No. 
2-8C5 as an infill test well; (2) that the Albert Smith No. 2-8C5 
was a test well, rather than a production well, the continued 
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operation of which, during the approved test period, did not violate 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act nor the Board's Order in Cause No. 
139-8 and the drilling thereof should not be enjoined; and (3) that 
the plaintiff as a nonconsenting owner was not required to pay any of 
the costs of drilling such well at that time, whether the Gulf test 
well was a dry hole or a producing hole operating during the 60-day 
period. Said Order was issued on an emergency basis and was to 
remain effective for 15 days from the date of issuance with any 
objection to the Order to be received not later than October 17, 1980 
with the further stipulation that the Board, in the absence of 
objection, would accept the Emergency Order as a final Order at the 
Board's October 23, 1980 hearing. Said order in Cause No. 139-20 was 
dated October 3, 1980 (R. at 6-13). 
Oneer a Stipulation, Motion and Order for Dismissal, the 
parties to Civil No. C-80-7024 stipulated that an order be entered in 
said cause dismissing the action with prejudice and on the merits 
upon the grounds, that said action had been rendered moot and the 
issues raised therein decided by the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining. 
Said action was dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits with 
each party to bear its own costs. (R. at 99). 
The issues raised by appellant in the lower court in Civil 
C-82-458 are moot and have been settled by the Emergency Order of the 
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Hoard of Oil, Gas & Mining dated October 3, 1980, as reaffirmed by 
the Board on October 22, 1981. 
The matters raised in Civil No. C-82-458 (the case on 
appeal to this Court) are res judicata. The Order of Dismissal of 
october 8, 1980 in Civil C-80-7024 was predicated upon the 
stipulation of the parties which specified "that an Order may be 
entered in this cause dismissing the above entitlted action with 
prejudice and on the merits upon the grounds that said action has 
been rendered moot and the issues raised herein decided by an 
emergency order of the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining dated October 3, 
1980**". (R.at99). 
The Order of the Court in dismissing Civil C-80-7024 was 
dispositive of the issue as to whether the Utah State Board of Oil, 
Gsa & Mining erred as a matter of law in determining that the 
drilling of the Albert Smith 2-9C5 infill test well was appropriately 
approved. 
The Order of the Court in Civil C-80-7024 was dispositive 
of the question as to whether said Board erred as a matter of law in 
designating the Albert Smith 2-8C5 Well as the unit production well 
within the parameters of those strictures imposed by the Division 
against its simultaneous production with the Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 
Wel 1. 
9 
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Said Order of Dismissal in Civil C-80-7024 was also 
dispositive of the question as to whether the Utah State Board of 
Oil, Gas & Mining erred as a matter of law in determining that 
Bennion was required to pay Gulf llil Corpor;;.tion, as operator, any 
part of the drilling, completing or equipping costs of the Albert 
Smith 2-8C5 Well. 
Since the matters raised in Civil No. C-82-458 have been 
decided in Civil No. 80-7024 and have been found moot, and the issues 
decided by Emergency Order dated October 3, 1980, Appellant became 
bound by that Order. We are not talking about a single issue or 
several issues; we are talking about the issues in that litigation 
which went to the heart of the Division's authority to authorize the 
drilling of the second well, allocation of costs, etc. This appeal 
should, accordingly, be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 
II. CIVIL NO. C-82-458 
It is important to consider what Bennion sought in his 
appeal from the Board's Order. In his prayer in Civil No. 
C-82-458 Bennion asked the Court to set aside the Order of the Board 
(the Order in Cause No. 139-20(B)) and asked that it remand said 
cause to the Board directing: 
(a). That the production and operation of 2-8C5 
Well is presently being done in violation of 
Section 40-6-6, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, Rule 
C-4 and the September 20, 1972, Order 
establishing the drilling unit, and that the 
well should therefore be shut-in and the 
10 
Be 
conclusion o 
expertise an 
Cause No. 
original production well in said section be 
reinstated as a designated production well for 
Section 8. (R. at 5). 
Bennion was asking the lower court to disregard the 
conclusion of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (predicated upon its 
expertise and the evidence adduced) expressed in its Order entered in 
Cause No. 139-20 that: 
State and Federal regulatory authorities, as well 
as those individuals with an interest in 
producing oil and gas from the Greater Altamont 
Bluebell Field in which the wells in controversy 
are located, have been aware of the fact that 
application of present drilling techniques under 
the current spacing pattern will result in only a 
9% recovery of the oil in place in that 
reservoir. To promote the greatest possible 
economic recovery of oil and gas from this 
region, the Board and Division have permitted 
numerous experiments, the drilling of test wells 
within the 640 acre unit to determine whether the 
Board's 640 acre spacing of this field was 
draining the area in the most effective manner. 
For example, Shell Oil Company was permitted to 
drill two experimental infill wells in the field 
on the basis of experimental 320 acre spacing. 
After testing these wells over a period of time, 
Shell Oil determined the area was being drained 
by the original wells and the test wells were 
uneconomic for that particular area. These test 
well have been shut-in to protect the correlative 
rights of others in compliance with the terms of 
the experimental permit issued by the Board and 
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. In the present 
case, it is postulated that due to the fact that 
the present Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 Well is not 
highly productive that a new infield well may 
drain the 640 acre tract more effectively and 
recover sufficient additional oil to be an 
economic well. Therefore, consistent with the 
mandate of the Board and Division to promote 
greater ultimate recovery of this resource, as 
11 
long as there exists a possibility for recovery 
for a reater ortion of the 90% of the oil in 
p ace o this ield, it is a pol icy o the Board 
that every effort should be made by the Board and 
Division to maximise sic] recover in this area. 
However, where such e orts prove unsuccess ul, 
test wells will be shut in to protect the 
correlative rights of other interest owners in 
the field. (Emphasis supplied]. (R. at 8-9). 
In other words, Bennion was asking the lower court to 
re-legislate the statutory mandate given to the Board, i.e.: 
***to foster, encourage, and promote the 
development, production and utilization of 
resources of oil and gas in the state of 
Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste; to 
authorize and to provide for the opeartion and 
develo ment of oil and as ro erties in such a 
manner that a greater u timate recovery o oi 
or gas may be obtained and that the correlative 
ri hts of all owners be full rotected***. 
Section 40-6-1 U.C.A. 953 as amen ed 
(E:nphasis ours). 
What Bennion sought was an order directing the Board to 
make an order for which it lacks authority to enter; he was asking 
the lower court to order the Board to defy the mandate of the 
leg is Liture. 
In the State Land Department vs. Painted Desert Park, Inc., 
3 Ariz. App. 568, 416 P.2d 989 (1966), the court, in treating an 
appeal from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the State and 
Department, ennunciated a vital rule, saying: 
In solving the problems before this court, we 
believe it is essential to keep in mind the 
nature of this proceeding. This is not an 
action arising in the Superior Court under the 
1 2 
broad, general jurisdiction of that court, but 
rather on an appeal from an administrative 
agency. As such, we believe that the Superior 
Court on appeal.could not enter a which 
the adm1n1strat1ve a enc below ha no authorit 
to enter. 416 P.2d at 992 Emphasis ours, 
The generally accepted principle is that when the court 
t1nds that an administrative agency has acted in compliance with a 
valid statute and has violated no principles of law applicable to the 
proceedings, it is the duty of the court to enforce the 
administrative order in the manner provided by statute. The court is 
required to grant enforcement of the order where the agency has acted 
properly within its designated sphere, has not acted contrary to law, 
and its findings are sutained by adequate evidence; or where the 
administrative agency has acted within its power, held a hearing 
comporting with procedural due process, made findings based on 
substantial evidence and provided an appropriate remedy. See 2 Am. 
Jur. 2nd, Administrative Law, §516 and cases cited. 
In his second, remaining prayer in Civil No. C-82-458, 
Bennion asked the Court to set aside the Order in Cause No. 
and to remand the cause to the Board directing it to enter 
an Order providing that: 
(b) In the alternative, if this Court determines 
that the production of the 2-8C5 Well is being 
lawfully done, that Gulf provide an accounting to 
Bennion on any and all salvage from the 1-8CS 
Well and that Bennion receive a credit on his 
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account for the present fair market value of said 
salvage. (R. at 5). 
By specific Order of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, the 
Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 Well was, and presently is, "shut-in" pending 
further order of the Board. It is a non-producing well; it is 
"shut-in'', but has not been plugged and abandoned. 
At such time as the Albert Smith No. 1-8C5 Well is plugged 
and abandoned (and only at such time) and the equipment and material 
therein recovered, saved, identified and sold, Bennion will be 
entitled to an accounting from Gulf of the salvage and will be 
entitled to a credit to his account for his proportionate share of 
the material and equipment so recovered, saved, identified, etc., 
less whatever amounts have been charged against said account by the 
operator, such as operating and production costs. 
Any such demand by Bennion for a credit to his account for 
the "present fair market value of the salvage" is improper and 
premature. Only at such time as the well is plugged and abandoned 
and the salvage operation is undertaken, can such a value 
determination and accounting be made. 
Ill. PROTECTION OF CORRELATIVE RIGHTS 
If we understand Appellant's argument in his Point I, he is 
suggesting that the original order in Cause No. 139-8 which 
established 640-acre spacing be modified to decrease the size of the 
drilling units (App. Brief, page 9). In some way, this would give 
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consirleration to the owners' economic concerns and presumably protect 
correlative rights. 
Section 8, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U.S.M. was 
communitized under Communitization Agreement of September 11, 1974, 
recorded September 16, 1974 in Book 136 M.R., pages 497-508. That 
Agreement was introduced in Civil No. C-80-7024 which file was 
incorporated at the direction of the lower court with the file in 
C-82-458. 
That document discloses that there are at least 62 owners 
of mineral interests in said Section 8; appellant is the owner of an 
unleased, undivided 0.53153% mineral interest in and under the 
subject section; there are 59 separate leaseholds committed to the 
communitization agreement. The mineral interest ownerships are not 
undivided interests throughout the entire sections; rather, they are 
divided interests and their participation in the production of oil 
and gas is had on the basis of the ratio their respective ownerships 
bear to the whole. 
The costs of drilling, equipping and operating the No. 1 
allocated to these various ownerships have long since been paid 
out. The costs and expenses of drilling and completing the No. 2 
Well have been advanced by Gulf Oil Corporation, the operator, on 
behalf of its various lessors and non-participating parties such as 
Mr. Bennion, Appellant herein. 
1 5 
When Bennion complains of the economic concerns of the 
mineral owners and the further expense to such parties it becomes a 
mockery - he has paid nothing. It is true that a portion of the 
production allocated to his mineral ownership is being credited 
against his share of those costs for drilling and completing the No. 
2 Well. 
There are three aspects of this situation which appellant's 
argument skirts and cannot address: (a) His suggestions would create 
an incredible confusion in the accounting for and payment of the 
development costs and expenses; (b) It ignores the accumulation of 
a huge amount of evidence presented to the Board in numerous causes 
since the promulgation of the order in Cause No. 139-8 which confirms 
the wisdom of the Board in establishing 640-acre spacing units; and 
(c) it would violate the correlative rights of the parties who are 
mineral interest owners in the subject section and would erase the 
contractual rights and interests of those mineral ownerships whose 
interests were pooled under the communitization agreement of 
September 14, 1974. 
Appellant would re-write the law to his own dictates but if 
he were to accomplish his stated end the question remains: Wherein 
lies the benefit to him? His is the best of all possible worlds. 
Someone else (Respondent) has advanced every penny for the drilling 
of Well No. 1 and Well No. 2; someone else (Respondent) has taken 
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all of the risks; if he (Bennion) is to enjoy the fruits of someone 
else's efforts and risks, he should be expected to pay the share of 
costs and expenses attributable to his 0.53153% mineral ownership. 
But that payment is not taken out of his pocket. Rather, it is 
recouped by the operator out of a share of the production allocated 
to Bennion's interest. We emphasize not the entire share, because he 
is entitled to the landowner's royalty of 1/8th. Paragraph (8) of 
the Order in Cause No. 139-20(B) provides that: 
S. H. Bennion is entitled to receive and Gulf 
shall tender a 1/8th cost-free royalty in kind 
beginning with the first production of said 
Albert Smith No. 2-8CS Well. (R. at 17). 
All these protections afforded by the legislature to the 
parties, be they lessor, lessee, operator, or unleased mineral owner, 
Appellant would destroy by his rewriting of the language of the Oil 
and Gas Conservation Act. He is a modern-day Sampson bent on 
bringing down on his head and the heads of his co-mineral owners the 
walls of a legislative scheme that has worked and worked well. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of Dismissal in Civil No. C-80-7024, entered with 
prejudice, is dispositive of the issues raised in Civil No. C-82-458 
and said latter action is barred thereby. 
Assuming, arguendo, that said action was not so barred, the 
lower Court properly held that the Board acted properly and within 
the scope of its authority in granting its Order in Cause No. 
17 
139-20[B]. The lower court properly refused to order the Board to 
violate the mandate of the statute under which it was created; it 
properly refused to direct the Board to disregard its own findings, 
conclusions and order, based upon evidentiary hearings which 
conformed with procedura 1 due process, to re instate the product ion of 
an uneconomic well (No. 1 Well) and shut-in a well (No. 2 Well) which 
was then in production and capable of commercial production. The 
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
RESPt:CTFULLY SUBMITTED t1is August, 1983. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on day of August, 1983, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, Gulf i)il 
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Peter Stirba 
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